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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
J. R. BAGNALL, aka JOSEPH R. 
BAGNALL, and FLORENCE BAGNALL, 
Plaintiffs and 
Respondents, 
vs, 
SUBURBIA LAND COMPANY, an 
Idaho corporation, et al., 
Defendants and 
Counter Appellants. 
Case No- 13,753 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS AND RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The case involves a breach of contract, repossession, and 
'other remedies to the seller as provided by contract. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Court, sitting with an advisory jury, found the issues 
in favor of the. plaintiffs and against the defendants. It further 
denied the defendants1 motion for judgment on the verdict, or, in 
the alternative, for a new trial, and granted judgment in favor of 
the plaintiffs, and against the defendants forfeiting the real es-
tate agreement and quieting title in the plaintiffs, except for an 
undivided 1/2 interest in 140.15 acres, which the court, by sum-
mary judgment and decree of quiet title, awarded to United Paint 
and Colors. Plaintiffs1 appeal from that order is also pending 
before this honorable Court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondents seek affirmation of the judgment and decree 
of the trial court. 
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EDITORIAL NOTE 
The respondents find it difficult to write a statement of 
facts in response to the distorted version of "facts" submitted 
by appellants. This difficulty exists because the appellants have 
failed to designate a sufficient portion of the record to enable 
the Supreme Court to intelligently evaluate the claims of both 
parties. The respondents have made an appropriate motion to dis-
miss the appellants' appeal, which motion is pending at the fil-
ing of this brief. 
The motion to dismiss is made because the appellants failed 
to designate the entire record pertaining to the issues on appeal 
to this court, but rather designated only a partial transcript 
which consisted of the following: (1) all the cross-examination 
of J. R. Bagnall, (2) the direct examination of Lester Romero, 
(3) cross-examination of Florence Bagnall, (4) direct examination 
of Reed R. Maxfield, (5) testimony of Lynn Nielsen, and (6) direct 
examination of Bruce Watkins and Jackson Wanlass. Appellants fail-
ed to bring up the record consisting of the missing portions in re-
gards to the above witnesses, and also the entire testimony of 
Judge Don V. Tibbs, Mildred S. Maxfield, LaVera Maxfield, Leland 
Peterson and John Brown. 
Because the respondents were concerned about the status of 
the transcript, they moved the court to compel the appellants to 
designate the entire record. Upon argument before the Utah Su-
preme Court, appellants1 counsel stated to the court that the 
record designated would sufficiently cover the disputed areas. 
The court, therefore, acquiesed in the appellants1 assertion that 
the record was. adequate to cover the appeal. 
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It was not until the appellant brief was received that res-
pondents discovered the record designated by appellants omits all 
contradictory and rebuttal evidence and testimony offered by 
plaintiffs-respondents. For these reasons, therefore, when refer-
ring to the record, respondents will be unable to designate the 
exact page of the record in support, but will merely state the re-
cord area in the following manner, e.g.: 
J. R. Bagnall - Direct, Cross (as the case may be) . 
Florence Bagnall - Direct, Cross (as the case may be). 
The appellant brief also fails to disclose that appellants 
are Suburbia Land Company of Idaho, Suburbia Land Company of Ne-
vada, Suburbia Land Company of Utah, and Lester Romero. 
Prior to appellants1 assertion to this Court that its record 
on appeal was adequate, respondents had a portion of the balance 
of the record designated. Therefore, there is a partial trans-
cript of additional testimony on file with the court. That par-
tial transcript covers the following testimony: J. R. Bagnall, 
re-direct; Lester Romer, cross and re-direct; Florence Bagnall, 
direct and re-direct; Bruce Watkins, cross, re-direct, re-cross, 
and re-direct; Reed Maxfield, a very small portion of cross-exam-
ination. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts of the appellants is more argument 
than fact. It is astounding and shocking to the respondents 
that the appellants, in this instance, contend that there is a 
similarity between the statement of facts as contained in the 
brief and that which is contained in the record. The truth is 
that there is but a fleeting similarity. The appellants have 
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failed to set forth that portion of the record which refutes and 
contradicts their version of the facts. They further have only 
stated, without the benefit of the record, the facts most favor-
able to them, without giving credence to the right of the court 
and the jury to believe the substantial, persuasive, and in this 
case, overwhelming accumulation of evidence to the contrary. 
Recognizing that a statement of facts should not be used to 
argue the point, we apologize in advance for the necessity of 
argument in response to argument, and beg the court's indulgence 
in our criticisms of the appellants brief. 
Mr. and Mrs. Bagnall are past 65 years of age. Mr. Bagnall 
holds a Masters Degree in education and Mrs. Bagnall is an accom-
plished writer. Both are gentle people, as indicated by their 
history. Mr. Bagnall was a former superintendant of schools of 
the North Sanpete County School District and has engaged in edu-
cational pursuits all his adult life. In addition, he has engag-
ed in farming since he was a small boy and grew up on the proper-
ty which was sold to the appellants and which he personally oper-
ated until 1952. (J. R. Bagnall - Direct, Florence Bagnall -
Direct) 
The property had been sold under a real estate contract in 
1952 to the respondents1 relatives, one of whom was Mrs* Nyberg, 
Mr. Bagnall1s sister by adoption. An action was commenced by the 
Bagnalls in 1962 to repossess the property. That action was han-
dled by the Bagnalls1 attorney, Don V. Tibbs, now Judge of the 
Seventh Judicial District. While the action was pending, Reed R. 
Maxfield made his appearance on the scene at Mr. Tibbs1 office. 
To paraphrase Mr. Tibbs1 testimony, Maxfield appeared in 
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Tibbs! office saying that he had purchased all the outstanding 
interest of the buyers under the 1952 contract (Tr. 3, 23, 24, 
27, 30, 31) and that he was.prepared to make payment of the de-
linquency then owing under the contract. He indicated he was 
living on the ranch. (Tr. 320) Within a day or two of that occa-
sion, the Bagnalls had come home from California for a short vaca-
tion and, by coincidence, while they were there, Maxfield again 
showed up in Tibbs1 office with his attorney, Mr* Robert Hughes, 
with a suitcase full of greenbacks. He made payment of the de-
linquency in this case in small demonination bills. (Tr. 21, 22, 
188) (J. R. Bagnall - Direct; Florence Bagnall - Direct; Don V. 
Tibbs - Direct, Cross) 
One cannot readily appreciate Mr. Maxfield!s demeanor and 
conduct without seeing him in court and without reading the des-
cription of the transaction given by Judge Tibbs. (Tr. 99) 
0 Q. Could you tell us how you remember that 
occasion? 
A. My recollection is that Mr. Maxfield 
came in some bib overalls, farm overalls, and 
they were big and, of course, I didn't know him 
and he sat down and I told him that he was going 
to have to have some money and he started to 
bring out, as I recall, tens and twenty dollar 
bills in sacks. 
Q. Bringing them out of where? 
A. Oh, every place that you could imagine, 
out of those overalls and I didn't think that 
there was that much money that came in overalls, 
if I may put it that way. 
As an adjunct to this description, Maxfield testified on 
cross-examination that the money came from his transactions "with 
the Uintah Finance Company, a company of which he was president 
and that had become insolvent, and that he preferred to take his 
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interest in business transactions in cash, that he did not believe 
in bank accounts, checking books, or record keeping. (Maxfield -
Cross) These facts are not contained in the appellants1 record. 
In any event, the modification agreement was prepared by Mr. 
Tibbs, who had relied upon the representations of Messrs. Maxfield 
and Hughes that Maxfield had acquired the outstanding interest of 
Mrs. Nyberg, the outstanding interest of all the other parties to 
the 1952 contract; that all he wanted was a deed put in escrow and 
that he would take care of the rest of the problems- He further 
stated he was prepared to sue the Bagnalls to enforce his rights. 
He further advised Mr. Tibbs that he was president of Suburbia 
Land Company, an Idaho corporation, and that he wanted the agree-
ment and deed made in favor of that corporation. (J. R. Bagnall -
Direct; Florence Bagnall - Direct; Don V. Tibbs - Direct and Cross 
Mr. Maxfield made his statements in unequivocal, dogmatic 
terms, more in the form of an ultimatum. After conversing with 
their attorney, Mr. and Mrs. Bagnall concluded that they were will 
ing to go forward with the contract if the payments were made, 
even though they had some concern about Mr. Maxfield because of 
the bizarre nature of his appearance, demeanor, and threat; and, 
of course, the unusual manner of payment. (Bagnalls - Direct; 
Don V. Tibbs - Direct and Cross) 
From 1962 to the time of trial, Maxfield was never again cur-
rent. The record of payment is set forth in Exhibit 9, a copy of 
which exhibit is set out herein. (Bagnalls - Direct; Anderson -
Direct and Cross) 
By July of 1969, the buyers had failed to make $15,502.23 in 
payments on the contract as evidenced by Exhibit !,37", and had 
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failed to pay the taxes and water assessments in the amount of 
$ as shown on Exhibit 9. (Note: This exhibit has 
been misplaced by the court or counsel for the appellants. When 
the exhibit is found, the dollar amount will be inserted.) 
Maxfield had come to the Bagnalls with complicated and fic-
tional stories of "title problems" he was encountering, none of 
which had any basis in fact, In any event, in the summer of 19 69 
the Bagnalls concluded that they had to take the property back. 
The property was in a sad physical condition. (Tr. 37,38) The 
indebtedness was increasing and their security had been diminish-
ed* They, therefore, employed a California law firm to commence 
the action. The history of the action is contained in the record. 
To make a long story short, the ultimate litigation culminated in 
this lawsuit in Sanpete County. (Bagnalls - Direct; Tibbs - Di-
rect and Cross) 
By various legal manipulations, the defendants-appellants 
were able to keep the lawsuit in a pre-trial status for more than 
four years. During that period of time, the respondents were con-
tinually frustrated by the appellants' refusal to comply with dis-. 
covery, by their convenient loss of documents, by threats of in-
jury to person and property, and other dishonorable conduct on 
the part of the appellants. (Bagnalls - Direct) 
The appellants have failed to tell the court that Suburbia 
Land Company, an Idaho corporation, was incorporated January 17, 
1961, and had its charter forfeited by the State of Idaho on Nov-
ember 30, 1961, and at the time of entering into this contract 
it had no legal standing in the State of Idaho or in any other 
state. (Exhibit 38) The evidence appears to be that the initial 
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officers and directors were a Mr- Rodriquez, a Mr* French, and a 
Mrs. Rodriquez. Mrs. Rodriquez was apparently a secretary in 
the law office of Robert Hughes. There are no other records for 
the corporation, because the minute books and other documents have 
been conveniently lost. In July of 1962, Reed Maxfield signed as 
president of the company, but it now appears that in 1962 the com-
pany did not have other officers, directors, capital, or status 
in any state. (Maxfield - Cross; Romero - Cross; Pretrial Order) 
The court will note that the defendants claim that the rights 
of Suburbia of Idaho, Inc. were transferred to Suburbia Land Com-
pany, a Nevada corporation, which was incorporated on October 8, 
19 62. This corporation had its charter forfeited in March of 
1964. (Tr. 24) The original directors of the Nevada corporation 
were a Mr. Roy Barrett, a Mr* Robert Hughes, and a Mrs* Sylvia 
Rodriquez. There is no evidence that there was a change in the 
directors of the corporation; however, Reed Maxfield, without the 
benefit of evidentiary support in his deposition and at the trial, 
claimed to be the president of the Nevada corporation, but he did 
not know any of the details of its existence or demise* There 
were no records for the Nevada corporation. (Tr. 183)(Maxfield 
- Cross; Romero - Cross, Exhibit 39) 
In respect to the qualification of the Nevada corporation in 
Utah for the purpose of doing business, the Nevada corporation 
filed a qualification statement in November of 19 62; however, it 
attached to its Utah application different articles than those 
which it had filed in the State of Nevada, and the articles filed 
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with the Secretary of State of the State of Utah were not signed 
or notarized and were not authenticated. The certificate to do 
business in the State of Utah; even though improperly issued in 
the first place, was revoked on March 9, 1964, for failure to com-
ply with the law. (Maxfield - Cross; Romero - Cross; Exhibits 
40 and 41) 
On August 27, 1960, the Utah corporation changed its service 
agent and filed a domestic information statement showing Lester 
Romero, president; Maxine Romero, vice-president; and Leland Pe-
terson, secretary-treasurer. This corporation had its charter 
suspended on September 15, 1970, for failure to pay taxes. (Max-
field - Cross; Romero - Cross; Exhibits 42, 43 and 44) 
The defendant, Reed Maxfield, then incorporated Suburbia . 
Land Company, a Utah corporation, on April 2, 1968* The directors 
of this corporation were Reed Maxfield, Lyndon Maxfield, his bro-
ther, and DeVerl Simmons, Mr. Maxfield!s hired man at the ranch 
in Chester. At this time, more than four years had transpired 
during which period there was not any corporation by the name of 
Suburbia Land Company with any authority to do business anywhere. 
During the course of the trial it developed that Leland Pe-
terson hcid never been secretary-treasurer of the Utah corporation. 
He was called as a witness for the respondents and testified that 
he knew nothing about Suburbia Land Company of Utah and claimed 
he had never been an officer or director and had never attended 
any stockholders meetings. The entire testimony of Lester Romero 
and Reed Maxfield in respect to this corporation was disputed and 
contradicted and the document filed with the Secretary of State 
concerning Peterson was perjurous and the testimony of Maxfield 
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and Romero in court concerning Peterson was unbelieved and per-
jurous. It is this corporation that appellants claim to have made 
the tender referred by the appellant on August 28, 1970* (Max-
field - Cross; Romero - Cross; Peterson - Direct and Cross) 
Mr. Romero contends that he has always been president of 
Suburbia Land Company, the Utah corporation, even though the tes-
timony of Mr. Romero and Mr. Maxfield in this regard is diametri-
cally opposed, (Maxfield - Cross; Romero - Cross) 
None of the above-stated facts are reflected in the record 
designated by the appellants, but all were material, germane and 
persuasive in the court's decision and in the jury's decision. 
Other facts not reported by the appellants nor designated in the 
record will be further stated. For example, on the date of the 
modification agreement, July 15, 1962, the balance owing on the 
contract was $54,142,15. (Exhibit 9, Bagnalls - Direct, Tr. 89) 
While on the date of trial, April 22, 19 74, the balance owing, ex-
clusive of taxes, interest and assessments, was $63,298.64 (Ex-
hibit 12) and there were delinquent taxes, interest, and assess-
ments payable of $5,880.46. (Exhibit 9, Bagnalls - Direct) In 
other words, during the time in which the appellants were in 
possession, and even though the contract was only a five percent 
contract, the outstanding balance increased by more than $14,000. 
Not only that, but the appellants also failed to tell the court 
that during the time they were in possession they failed to main-
tain the property with even minimal standards of husbandry. They 
allowed the fences to deteriorate and become broken; failed to 
maintain the buildings and wasted and depreciated the assets and 
security of respondents, (Tr. 37, 38, Bagnalls - Direct) None of 
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these facts are recited in the partial record designated by appel-
lants. 
It would be impossible, within fifty pages, to correct all 
the errors in appellants1 statement of facts; however, particu-
larizing the portions that seem most material, starting with page 
3, the following recited "fact" by the appellants requires com-
ment: 
At the time the modification agreement was signed on July 15, 
1962, Reed R. Maxfield represented he was the president of Subur-
bia Land Company and that Suburbia Land Company had acquired all 
of the outstanding interests of all other parties to the property. 
(Tr. 23, 24, 27) The appellees and their attorney at that time, 
Don V. Tibbs, relied upon the representations of Mr. Maxfield and, 
therefore, made a deed which was placed in escrow to all of the 
property on the theory that the representations made by Maxfield 
were true. The fact is that they were true, but that Maxfield, 
for devious, duplicitious and unscrupulous purposes, had deleted 
one-half of the 140 acres acquired from Mrs. Nvberg and left it in 
Utah Valley Land and Development Corporation, a corporation in 
which he had an influential interest, if not control, and which 
corporation conveyed the same property to United Paint and Colors 
Company on March 26, 197 4. United Paint and Colors Company is a 
corporation owned by Mr. Maxfield1s parents and brother. The res-
pondents have always paid the taxes on this property, even during 
the delinquency of the appellants. (Bagnalls - Direct, Exhibit 9) 
The entire transaction between the appellants and respondents 
was bizarre. The respondents never knew with whom they were deal-
ing. Maxfield had an elusive and transient air about him and he 
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dealt with corporations that came and went like the wind. Fur-
thermore, he never kept any business records* He made what pay-
ments he made in cash. He contends, for example, concerning his 
alleged July, 1969, tender, that he had some $140,000 in cash 
kept in a duffle bag in the closet of his house. (Maxfield - Cross; 
Mrs. Maxfield - Cross) The testimony of Mrs. Maxfield was so tot-
ally incredible that the court and jury rightfully concluded that 
the Maxfields were never able and willing to make tenders. During 
the period that Maxfield claimed to have over $3 00,000 in cash in 
his closet he was attempting to borrow against the property at 
the Bank of Ephraim. (Tr. 300) The jury found, as did the court, 
that none of the tender offers were made in good faith and at no 
time did any of the parties, Suburbia, Maxfield, or Romero, have 
money by which they could make payment. (Finding of Fact 3 5) 
Getting back to appellants1 brief, a great amount of space 
was used showing that plaintiffs-respondents were to render a ti-
tle opinion as soon as possible. The fact of the matter is that 
Mr. Tibbs testified, as did Bagnalls, that they were not to ren-
der a title opinion at all, but rather that they were to get the 
abstract prepared, deliver it to the buyer, and the buyer was to 
have an opportunity to obtain a title opinion if he so desired. 
Judge Tibbs testified concerning the custom in Sanpete County and 
the court instructed the jury that he took judicial notice that 
the ordinary custom in the profession was that the buyer secured 
a title opinion for the property. (Record of Court; Finding of 
Fact 19; Special Verdict 9) 
In respect to the abstract of title, notwithstanding the re-
peated claim that the respondents had not furnished the abstract, 
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the record clearly showed, and Mr. Tibbs testified, that he call-
ed Mr. Maxfield repeatedly and asked him to pick up the abstract 
for the purpose of reading it and Maxfield never attempted, prior 
to the trial date, to acquire the abstract for the purpose of 
checking the title- (Tibbs, Bagnalls - Direct) 
One other contention that is totally without foundation is 
that the one-half interest in the 140 acres is in the central part 
of the ranch- It is in one of the lesser parts of the land, be-
ing meadowland that has been badly treated, is poorly situated, 
and presently is a bog. The contention that the appellants con-
cerning the one-half interest in the 140 acres, that the sellers , 
were to furnish a title opinion is just contrary to fact and con-
trary to evidence and is without record support in the appellants1 
brief. 
There was, in fact, no defect in the title of the respon-
dents. The appellants made no genuine claim that there was a de-
fect of title prior to the commencement of this action. Admitted-
ly, Maxfield prepared some deeds which he took to the respondents, 
contending that there were some outstanding interests, but upon 
searching the title it was obvious and clear that he. had manufac-
tured a title flaw where none existed. He obtained deeds from a 
Mr. Powell, but Powell had no conflicting claim. The implication 
that there was a flaw in the title is false. (Tr. 79, Bagnalls 
- Direct; Maxfield - Cross) The Phillips Oil Company had checked 
the title to the property, considered that the title to the pro-
perty was clear and took a lease to the Bagnall property on the 
basis that the title was clear. (Tr. 77) Further, the Bagnalls 
had, by contract, retained the interest that they leased to Phil- * 
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lips. (Bagnall - Direct) 
In respect to the statements made by the appellants concern-
ing the abstracts, the title opinion and the interest of Nyberg 
on page 5 of their brief, it would suffice to say that the evi-
dence was totally controverted by Mr- Tibbs and the Bagnalls, and 
the testimony of Maxfield was just unbelieveable, and the record 
of the trial would so demonstrate were it before the court* 
(Tibbs, Bagnalls - Direct) 
In respect to the water stock referred to on page 6 of the 
brief, by inadvertance one certificate covering six shares of 
stock were, in fact, not put in the escrow agreement. See also 
letter, Exhibit 23. The appellants had never made a demand for 
the said stock and the water represented by the stock was being 
used by the appellants. The respondents at all times during the 
course of the contract had substantially complied with the con-
tract and the failure to put the stock in the escrow agreement 
was not a material breach of contract that would justify nonpayment 
of installments due under the purchase price• When the respon-
dents learned of the error, they corrected it and the stock was 
put into escrow. The record, were it brought before the court, I 
would so demonstrate and, therefore, the contentions set forth 
in appellants1 brief are without foundation and fail to show the 
contrary and rebutting testimony offered by respondents. (Bag-
nalls - Direct; Tibbs - Anderson) 
Concerning an alleged title flaw because there exists a I 
county road and railroad track on the property which was not dis-
closed in the abstract, one merely states that the buyer cannot 
claim a title defect against facts and circumstances which were 
obvious to any buyer. The railroad track has been on the pro-
i 
i 
i 
I 
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perty since 1896 and the county road had been on the property 
since the memory of man runneth not to the contrary. In fact, 
Maxfield had to drive down the county road to get to the ranch 
house in which he was living when he entered into the agreement 
of July, 1962. It must have been obvious to him that it was a 
county road and that it took a portion of the ranch from the 
acreage contained in the abstract, which was primarily described 
by sections and quarter-sections* To contend that this was a 
title flaw is to insult the intelligence of the court. Further-
more, the appellants have failed to bring up the record concern-
ing the admission of this fact and the court1s comment on it, 
whereas were it before the court, in record form, it would be 
obvious that the trial court judge properly disposed of that mat-
ter. (Finding of Fact 23) 
Counsel stated that on page 7 of the brief that Reed R. Max-
field, then president of Suburbia Land Company of Utah, knew that 
the plaintiff could not comply with the agreement. This runs con-
trary to the testimony of Lester Romero, who contends that he was 
president of Suburbia from April of 1968. It was on the basis of 
Romero's testimony that Maxfield was dismissed as a party to the 
action because he could not have been an officer, director, or al-
ter ego of Suburbia by reason of his testimony and that of Rom-
ero's. On the basis of his representations to the court, he was 
released from the case, and yet he has the audacity to state on 
page 7 of his brief and represent to this court that he was presi-
dent of the company. There is very little truth in the represen-
tations of the appellants reflected on page 7 of the brief, and, 
therefore, these respondents can find no nice way in which to say 
that they disagree with the representations. Such assertions con-
- K -
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cernirig the alleged rejection of the tender were totally refuted by 
the Bagnalls and Tibbs and are unsupported by evidentiary record. 
The assertion by the appellants that tenders made by Max-
field, Romero, or Suburbia were in good faith is erroneous for a 
multitude of reasons, none of which are reflected'in the record 
brought before this court; however, the substance of the reasons 
was that Maxfield was so elusive in respect to the corporations 
(Suburbia) or the persons for whom he was allegedly making a ten-
der and was so elusive in respect to what he was tendering that 
it was apparent from the proof that was presented that neither 
Maxfield nor Romero had means of making a bona fide tender during 
any of the period of time which any of them were in possession* 
The court found that the alleged tenders were all in bad faith 
because the exact amount owing on the contract was easily deter-
mined from the records of the Bank of Ephraim(Tr. 17, 34, 37, 
95, 131, 133, 5) or for that matter, from the records of Subur-
bia, Maxfield or Romero, had they made an effort to put their pen-
cils to the calculations. The tenders, as made, were simply a 
subterfuge. Furthermore, the representation to the court that a 
tender was made by Suburbia Land Company, a Utah corporation, in 
September of 1970, when that very month the corporation's charter, 
was revoked for failure to pay franchise taxes is somewhat incon-
sistent with the contention that it had money to make payment. 
Mr. Romero's performance on cross-examination concerning his 
relationship with Suburbia of Utah would tax the credulity of a 
child. He did not know anything about the corporation, its con-
ception, its operation, where its records were, what bank accounts 
it had, the fact that its charter had been revoked, etc. (Romero 
- Cross) It was proved conclusively by the respondents from the Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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belated admissions of Maxfield (Tr. 15, 16, 67) and Romero that 
none of the corporations, at any time, paid taxes to the State 
or Federal governments, nor did they, in fact, file tax returns 
(Tr. 67) notwithstanding the fact that appellants were operating 
the ranch and selling grain, produce, and cattle and had leased 
a part of it for which they had rental income. Nothing was re-
ported to the government. (Tr. 67; Stipulation into the record) 
The trial court, contrary to the representations of the ap-
pellants, ruled categorically into the record during the trial 
that none of the tenders made by the appellants were valid. 
(Finding of Fact 18; Record not furnished) 
In respect to the $400.00 payment that was received by the 
Bank of Ephraim, that sum was received by the bank by virtue of 
an order of the court that it be conditionally held in a separ-
ate account by the^bank until the disposition of this case. 
Neither the bank nor respondents accepted the money. (Bagnalls; 
Maxfield - Cross; Anderson; files and pleadings) Appellants did 
not see fit to redeem that $400.00 and now contend that it con-
stituted a payment which was accepted, and, therefore, constitut-
ed a waiver. This statement of fact is blatantly contrary to 
truth, to testimony, and to the record, had the record been 
brought before this court. 
When the appellants state that they have sustained much pain 
and suffering in this case, (see page 9 of their brief) the sub-
stance of the pain and suffering, just like the substance of the 
facts and truth in this case, lie with the respondents, not the 
appellants. It is particularly galling to the respondents to 
have an emotional appeal made on "facts" that are unsupported or 
refuted by other witnesses in the record and which, as presented, 
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could only constitute a fraud upon this court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RESPONDENTS WERE NEVER IN DEFAULT UNDER THE TERMS OF THE 
MODIFICATION AGREEMENT. 
Contrary to the assertions of the appellants, the question 
of marketable title was never a point of issue since Maxfield re-
presented to Mr. Tibbs and to the sellers that he had acquired 
all of the balance of the outstanding interest of the parties. 
(Tr. 3, 23,. 24, 27, 30, 31) Relying on his own assertions, the 
modification agreement of July 15, 1962 was made. To blatantly 
state that there was an outstanding title in the name of Mrs. Ny-
berg acquired by Utah Land & Development Company and, subsequent-
ly acquired by Utah Paint and Colors Company, a Utah corporation, 
requires appellants' to ignore the testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Bag-
nail and Mr. Tibbs. (Tr. 69, 72, 74, 79, 81, 119) It further re-
quires this court to ignore what the trial court and the jury ob-
viously believed, to-wit, that Maxfield controlled Utah Valley 
Land & Development Corporation and that Maxfield, in fact, had ac-
quired the interest of Jane B. Nyberg and Utah Valley Land &'De-
velopment Corporation and that such interest (United Paint & Colors 
Company) was conveyed out by Maxfield purposely in order to create 
a flaw in the title justifying his failure to make payment under 
the contract as required. 
At no time did Maxfield advise Bagnalls of this alleged title 
flaw until the action was commenced and even then, it was not un-
til October 20, 1971, that United Paint and Colors Company, a 
Utah corporation, acquired title to this outstanding interest. 
That corporation is controlled by Maxfield's mother, father and Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
brother. The jury and the court found Maxfield1s position unten-
able and properly concluded that if there were a flaw in the 
title, it was at the instance of Maxfield and the appellants. 
(Special Verdict 4, 13, 14, 15; Finding of Fact 23) 
There is no adequate record before the court upon which the 
facts related herein can be completely documented; however, it 
must be sufficient to state that if the entire record had been 
brought up, the respondents could clearly sustain their position 
in the record. 
The appellants seem to take comfort out of the preliminary 
conclusions of the court contained in the pretrial order (see Pre-; 
trial Order, pps. 6, 7) related to this alleged defect in the ti-
tle. The court stated in open court when reviewing the matter 
and rendering its judgment that the pretrial order was made with-
out sufficient information, and when there was contrary believ-
able evidence before the court, the court was obligated to correct 
the pretrial finding and, therefore, the pretrial order could not 
stand opposed to the proof of fact. (see entire Findings of Fact; 
Decree; and Record) It would have been error for the court to 
have ruled otherwise than it did in Findings of Fact Nos. 14, 15, 
16, 17, and 18. 
In respect to the oil and gas lease of Phillips Petroleum 
Company, the plaintiffs-respondents had a perfect right to lease 
the oil, gas, and water rights to the property. (Bagnalls, Ex-
hibits 34 and 35) The entire lease was contingent upon this lit-
igation and Phillips was willing to assume the risk of the right 
of the respondents to lease, knowing full well the pending liti-
gation and the claimed rights of Maxfield and his friends. (Bag-
nalls - Direct) Furthermore, under the sellers' contract with Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the buyer, they retained the fee right to 1/2 of the oil, gas 
and minerals. (Bagnalls - Direct; Exhibits 3, 35) 
Whether the sellers were in default under the terms of the 
modification agreement of 1962 is a factual question* It is res-
pondents1 contention that there was sufficient evidence in the 
total record, if it were before the appellate court, to support 
such a finding* Respondents, therefore, cite no case ciuthority 
because Point I is a factual issue which the court correctly de-
cided and the record would so demonstrate if it were brought be-
fore this court in its entirety. 
POINT II 
THE APPELLANTS NEVER MADE A VALID OR TIMELY TENDER TO THE 
RESPONDENTS FOR THE DELINQUENCIES DUE UNDER THE CONTRACT. 
This point is like the first point. The appellants assume 
there are no facts contrary to that which they assert. The fact 
is that the evidence of tender by appellants was so shallow and 
frivolous as to cause the court and jury to question the good 
faith of the appellants in making such an argument. . It would 
seem apparent from the argument made by the appellants that his, 
its or their tender depending on who it happens to be at the 
time, was not made in good faith. Even though the exact amounts 
owing were within Maxfield1s knowledge, (Tr. 5, 16, 17, 34, 95, 
131, 132) he continually wrote letters offering to pay "any and 
all amounts due" to the sellers. The language in the tenders of 
Maxfield, Suburbia, Mrs. Maxfield and Romero are all identical 
and were all written on the same typewriter, obviously by Reed 
Maxfield. (Maxfield - Cross; Mrs. Maxfield - Cross) I 
It was apparent that Maxfield was playing coy with the sel-
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parties, Suburbia, Maxfield or Romero, were able at any time to • 
make payment of the delinquent amount owing to- the sellers* The 
record is replete with evidence of financial inabilities such as 
the inability to pay income tax, the inability to pay franchise 
tax, the revocation of charters, the delinquency in water asses-
sments, the delinquency in payment of property taxes, the unsuc-
cessful attempts to borrow money, (Tr. 300) all during the period 
of time in which appellants contend they were making tenders. 
During this time, Bagnalls, in order to prevent tax sale of their 
property, were required to make the payment of taxes owing against 
the property and water. (Bagnalls - Direct; Tibbs; Exhibit 9) 
None of these facts are contained in the record brought up by 
appellants. 
Appellants further fail to tell the court that when the 
plaintiffs attempted to accept the tenders the defendants offered 
them cemetary lots (Tr. 106, 165) in Las Vegas , Nevada, or coupon 
books for frozen foods in some food distribution program, (Tr. 
165) but never money. The Bagnalls had no confidence in Maxfield 
(Tr. 38) after his repeated and persistent delinquencies. (Tr. 
85) At no time from 1969 to 1974 did the defendants, in fact, 
offer the plaintiffs money to bring up the delinquencies. (Bag-
nalls - Direct; Maxfield - Cross) On the contrary, Mr. and Mrs. 
Bagnall testified that in July, 1969, they went to see Maxfield 
at the ranch. At this time they noted the deplorable condition 
of their ranch. (Tr. 37.38) They plead with Mr. Maxfield to 
bring the delinquencies up because they had payments of their own 
to meet. Mr. Maxfield, contrary to his assertion that he always 
had funds, explained to them that he was not going to pay them, 
that he didn't have any money, and that he had already mortgaged Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the property and everything on it to other people, (Tr. 35, 36, 
39, 165) He even produced a copy of the mortgage that he had 
made to LaVera Maxfield, his mother, which he had put on the en-
tire property to cloud the title. (Exhibit 54) This he did even 
though he did not have a deed to the property. Furthermore, he 
told Bagnalls that he was skilled in this type of enterprise and 
that he would make the matter so complicated and so difficult 
that no lowyer could disentangle and clear the title. (Tr. 39) 
The substance of his statements to the respondents at that time 
was that there was nothing that could be done to collect the 
money from him, that it was his ranch, and that he was not going 
to pay them any money for it. This comment was. made at the same 
time he contends he was making a tender. (J. R. Bagnall - Direct) 
It was this particular tender which Maxfield said in court 
he could have made because he had $140,000 in a duffle bag in his 
closet. The fact that Maxfield did not do business in an ortho-
dox manner was sufficient to cause the jury to believe that he 
was not entirely a wholesome character. His willingness to pre-
varicate was sufficient to discredit his entire testimony before 
the jury. (Bagnalls - Direct; Maxfield - Cross) 
During cross-examination he was caught in one lie after 
another. Maxfield, as a credible witness, was totally impugned* 
For example, Maxfield, after parading before the jury his vast 
experience as a corporate officer and director, admitted he did 
not know a corporation had to do such fundamental things as 
maintain its charter in good standing. (Tr* 79) It is impos-
sible for the respondents to recite the facts as to Maxfield's 
credibility because the complete record is not before the court. 
The most that the respondents can do in this brief is to recite Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the facts from memory. 
Appellants extensively argue the pretrial order concerning 
the validity of the tender. The court, in its pretrial order, 
however, did not pass judgment on whether the tender was made in 
bad faith as that aspect was specifically reserved for trial. 
(See Pretrial Order IV, 6) The appellants tend to ignore the 
special interrogatories served on the jury which, when read to-
gether, conclude that appellants1 tenders were unperformable and 
made in bad faith. The court itself concluded that the tenders 
made were all in bad faith* (See Finding of Fact 18) It does 
not serve the appellants well to argue to this court, as fact, 
that which is contrary to the fact proven and for which there is-
substantial evidence. 
This court has repeatedly said that the statement of facts 
and the argument must be on the basis of the facts as they may 
have been believed by the court and jury. On the basis of evi-
dence presented, it is impossible for the respondents to under-
stand how the court could have ruled otherwise than that the 
tenders were made in bad faith. Appellants engage in the gym-
nastics of citing the pretrial order to the effect that their 
tenders would be satisfactory if made in good faith and then to-
tally ignore all evidence that they were made in bad faith. 
It is not sufficient to cite the Utah statutes on.a valid 
tender. Both parties are aware of these statutes. The tender 
statutes were argued at length and with briefs. The fact remains 
that the court and jury found, on a question of fact, that the 
tenders were made in bad faith by persons who were incapable of 
making tenders, by persons who were not privy to the contract, by 
persons who had no legal existence and status, and by persons who Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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did not have practical capability of performing the tenders. 
Since the facts are totally against the appellants on Point II, 
it seems futile for respondents to argue the law. 
a The appellants belabor the court's Findings of Fact which 
are amply supported by the special verdict of the jury. It is 
fundamental that the appellants can not complain'of a Finding 
of Fact which is supported by material and substantial evidence. 
The difficulty with the appellants' position is that they have 
failed to bring to this court the entire record, but rather have 
chosen to be selective in designating only certain portions of 
the transcript from which they would appeal. 
Referring to page 33 of the appellants' brief concerning the 
testimony of Bruce Watkins, the appellants would have the court 
believe that there was a commitment by the Clearfield State Bank 
for $15,000.00. On cross-examination, Mr. Watkins admitted that 
the most he had before the bank was an application of many months 
prior which had not been acted upon for a variety of reasons, 
(Tr. 30, 52) all the fault of Mr. Maxfield. Peculiarly the appli-
cation was by Mr. Maxfield for property in Sanpete County. It 
was for a loan to him personally. He had never complied with all 
of the terms of the application, such as furnishing a financial 
statement. Mr. Watkins further testified that it would be impro--
bable for the Clearfield State Bank to make the loan on property 
in Sanpete County, that if a loan were to be considered it would 
have to be complete documentation including knowledge of the sta-
tus of the owner, (Tr. 51) in this case, Suburbia Land Company of 
either Idaho, Nevada or Utah, depending on the case. (Tr. 59) 
He further stated that Maxfield had only indicated that he was a 
stockholder in one of the companies, but he did not know the de-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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tails of Mr. Maxfield's ownership, nor did he know the amount of 
stock outstanding, nor the status of the company, (Tr. 55) all of 
which he said would have been essential before making a loan. He 
further stated that any loan application had to be approved by 
the loan committee because it had never been submitted to the 
bank in a complete form. He further stated that upon cross-
examination, had he known the facts which had been elicited in 
trial concerning the status of Suburbia Land Company, the sta-
tus of Maxfield, and the other material items to the loan appli-
cation which would have been required, the Clearfield Bank under 
no circumstances would have made the loan. (Tr. 55, 59) To 
contend to this court that there was a commitment is to mislead 
• • > . • # • - . . 
this court. 
Referring to Mr. Romero's claim of personal assets, the 
thrift certificates referred to were the most dubious of evidence 
and were admitted through sheer tolerance of the court. The court 
recognized the objections to the admissibility of such photostats 
of certificates of trust issued by Interlake Thrift, noting that 
there was no proof that Interlake Thrift was a viable company, 
that the certificates had not been mortgaged, pledged or other-
wise encumbered, or that Romero, in fact, could obtain money from 
the said certificates. (Tr. 364) The court also acknowledged 
that the best evidence of whether Romero could have gotten money 
out of those certificates would have been to call someone from 
Interlake Thrift Company to testify that those certificates were 
in good standing on the date of the alleged tender. 
The appellants cap their conclusion in respect to Point II 
with this comment: 
Such testimony by them [Bagnalls] is unsup-
ported by anything other than their naked word. ; 
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This statement causes the respondents to believe that Bag-
nalls1 naked word was like gold compared to the evidentiary lead 
offered by the appellants. 
The Supreme Court of Utah in Hyams v. Bamberger, 10 Utah 3, 
36 P. 202 (1894), said that to have the effect of a valid tender, 
the party making a tender "must have the ability to produce it, 
and must act in good faith." Although an old case, it is still 
good law. The weight of the evidence at trial in the instant 
case overwhelmingly demonstrated appellants inability to produce 
the delinquent amount after the Bagnalls had made repeated demands. 
POINT III 
RESPONDENTS NEVER REFUSED TO GIVE AN ACCOUNTING TO THE APPEL-
LANTS, BUT EVEN IF THEY HAD, SUCH REFUSAL WOULD NOT CONSTITUTE A 
WAIVER OF PERFORMANCE/ 
It became obvious to the court and jury that in tne entire 
series of tenders by Maxfield for Suburbia, Romero, or himself, 
he never noted for whom he was making a tender. That the tenders 
were in bad faith is a conclusion that is inescapable .from the 
manner and conduct of the appellants* 
The ranch on which Maxfield was living when the lawsuit was 
instituted is located less than five miles from Ephraim. The Bag-
nalls were living in California. At all times when the alleged 
tenders were made, Maxfield merely had to go to the Bank of Eph-
raim to determine the balance owing on the contract or to deter-
mine the delinquency owing on taxes, water assessments, and prin-
cipal and interest payments. The bank kept a running account in 
its escrow ledger of the balance owing and could have calculated 
for Maxfield, Romero, or Suburbia the deficiencies at any given 
time. (Tr. 16, 17, 34, 95, 131, 132) Rather than avail himself 
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of the escrow agreement to which Suburbia was signatory, Maxfield 
chose to write the very vague proffers of performance. 
The assertions of appellants that the respondents had refus-
ed payment of the delinquencies and had insisted on the payment 
of the entire amounts due and owing is contrary to the facts. 
Both of the Bagnalls testified on direct examination that prior 
to instituting suit they requested payment of the delinquencies 
only (Tr. 38, 151) and had, in fact, journeyed to the ranch in 
July of 1969, to make demand for those deficiencies and hoping 
to be paid those deficiencies. Instead, they.were met by the 
responses of Maxfield that he was not going to pay them, that he 
had mortgaged the property, that it was totally encumbered, and 
that he did not have any money, (Tr. 38, 39, 16 5) but that the 
best he could do or would do was give them some cemetary lots 
(Tr. 38, 165) or some coupon books in a frozen food program. 
The appellants have refused to recognize or to so advise this 
court of these facts which were elicited repeatedly. Such testi-
mony would be amply supported in the direct and cross-examination 
of Judge Tibbs and in the direct examination of Mr. and Mrs. Bag-
nail. But even if one were not to rely entirely upon the direct 
examination of Mr. Bagnal.l, it seems to these respondents that 
it is difficult for the appellants to escape Mrs. Bagnall's com-
ment on cross-examination by Mr. Lord on page 150 and 153 of the 
transcript they did send up, to this effect: 
Q. You didn't at any time along at that 
meeting (July 6 to 6, 1969), state that you did 
not want the property back? 
• A. N o . 
Q. You did not at any time state that you 
did want the property back. 
-27- • 
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A. We said at the end when we left him, well, 
if you won't pay us then there is nothing left for 
us to do but to sue. 
Q. Escuse me, I thought you were through-
Isn't it also a fact that you demanded the entire 
balance? 
A. No. 
Q. That you stated to him that he was to pay 
off the contract in full? 
A- No. At that time we were asking for delin-
quencies. 
The court should also be aware of the fact that Mr- Tibbs had 
been trying to get Maxfield to pay these deficiencies by telephone 
and letter prior to the date of the Bagnalls1 visit to Mr- Maxfield. 
In fact, the Bagnalls journeyed out to see Mr. Maxfield to see if 
they could collect the delinquencies upon the advise of Mr. Tibbs. 
(Tr. 121) 
Judge Tibbs, in his letter of July 9 (Defendants' Exhibit 
16), refers to Maxfield's previous offers of partial payment. 
Judge Tibbs testified that Maxfield had suggested rewriting the 
contract and making payments substantially different than those 
to which he was obligated and that after the visit of the Bag-
nalls he wrote the letter of July 9, 1969. He further stated that 
the letter of July 9 was only intended as a demand that the delin-
quencies be paid, which was consistent with his previous oral com-
munications with Maxfield. He testified that that letter did not 
contemplate payment of the entire balance due under the contract 
and that Maxfield knew, or should have known it, by reason of 
that letter and the previous oral communications between Tibbs 
and Maxfield. This is a further illustration of the appellants' 
efforts at distorting the facts. 
The appellants, in summary, state "defendants could not make Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
a tender of money because they had no way of knowing the amount 
due." This type of commentary to this court in light of the re-
cord that has been offered is grossly misleading. Respondents 
cite no case law for Point III because the question of whether 
the amount of the buyers1 delinquency was readily known to them 
is a fact question. 
POINT IV 
THE RESPONDENTS1. NOTICE OF DEFAULT WAS EFFECTIVE. 
The court, in the pretrial order, found that the respondents1 
notice of default was good. In addition, the court found that 
the notice served upon Reed R. Maxfield on July 31, 1970, was a. 
notice stating that Suburbia Land Company was in default under 
the real estate agreement and modification agreement. The notice 
provided for thirty days in which to clear the default, otherwise 
the respondents would elect to terminate the agreements. The 
court further found (Finding of Fact 12) that the thirty-day no-
tice provided for compliance and the notice of default and ter-
mination was reasonable under the circumstances. These were 
questions of fact. The notice as written and.served satisfied 
the requirements of the contract and of the law* 
POINT V 
RESPONDENTS DID NOT ACCEPT PAYMENT AFTER THEIR EFFECTIVE NO-
TICE TO APPELLANTS ON MAY 25, 1970, AND, THEREFORE, THE CONTRACT WAS 
NEVER REINSTATED. 
In accordance with the appellants usual candor, they have 
failed to mention that the simple $400.00 payment was surretiously 
made to the Ephraim Bank in a deliberate effort to develop a wai-
ver. The appellants knew litigation was pending and that the res-, 
pondents had no intention of accepting any delinquent payments. 
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Furthermore, the payment made was totally inadequate under any 
sense of the word and was made for the purpose of creating a de-
fense. 
When the respondents were advised to the attempted payment, 
the matter was presented to the court at a time when Judge Erick-
son was the judge. Judge Erickson ordered the payment held by 
the bank in a special account subject to the completion of the 
litigation. The appellants did not designate Judge Erickson1s 
order as part of the record. On Exhibit 11, the records of the 
Bank of Ephraim show this notation in respect to its receipt of 
the $400.00: 
Not accepted. Court order by Judge Erick-
son to place in special fund. 
When arguing the matter to Judge Erickson, it became appar-
ent to the appellants that Judge Erickson did not favor their 
theory of the case, consequently, they filed an affidavit of pre-
judice against him, thereby getting a new judge* The circumstances 
surrounding payment of this $400.00 have become obscured in the 
legal folderol that has taken place in respect to the entire case. 
If the $400.00 payment had been made simply as a delinquent 
payment and had been accepted, there may have been some truth to 
the appellants1 position, however, appellants know that the repre-
sentations made under Point V are contrary to the fact and are 
totally refuted by the evidence. 
POINT VI 
THE SINCERITY OF APPELLANTS1 OFFER TO PAY THE ENTIRE CONTRACT 
BALANCE WOULD HAVE BEEN BEST DEMONSTRATED UNDER RULE 67, U.R.C.P., 
THEREFORE, THEIR OFFER TO PAY THE SAME TO THE COURT SHOULD BE DIS-
REGARDED.. 
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Point VI is similar to Point V in as much as appellants at-
tempt to lift themselves by their own bootstraps since appellants 
fail to support their allegations concerning a proffer in Judge 
Erickson1s court with any transcript of the record* The best we 
have is appellants1 blatant assertion that Judge Erickson refused 
to allow the proffer of appellants to be heard on the motion to 
accept the proffer of proof. No one knows whether the appellants 
had sufficient money to make a tender* There certainly exists no 
evidence of ability to make a valid tender in the record of the 
court. 
The truth seems inconsistent with appellants1 argument for 
if the appellants had wanted to make payment in the court, they 
could have done so pursuant to Rule 67 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Nothing would have prevented the appellants from pay-
ing any amount of money into court. The appellants1 position is 
always the same. They want to make their tender without showing 
any abili.ty to perform. The sincerity of the appellants would 
have been best demonstrated by a tender into court of spendable 
money. 
POINT VII 
THE FAILURE OF RESPONDENTS TO AMEND THE PRETRIAL ORDER WAS 
NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
Appellants argue that the pretrial order and findings of the 
court are "mutually contradictory" and that the "plaintiff should 
have been required to amend the pretrial order." 
It is true that the Utal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 16, 
contemplate that a pretrial order may be amended under the pro-
per cricumstances to "prevent manifest injustice." The instant 
case, however, does not require any such amendment of the pretrial Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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order to prevent "manifest injustice." The failure of plaintiffs to 
so amend was not reversible error. 
Any contradiction between the pretrial order and findings of 
the court is not reversible error because the only purpose of a 
pretrial order is to control "the subsequent course of the action" 
and, therefore, a pretrial order is not dispositive of the case. 
The pretrial order is not so important so as to displace the de-
cision-malting province of a court. Any contradictions between a 
pretrial order and the court's ultimate decision do not consti-
tute reversible error. 
POINT VIII 
IT WAS NOT ERROR FOR THE COURT TO BE SELECTIVE IN ITS ACCEP-
TANCE OF PORTIONS OF THE JURY VERDICT AND REJECTION OF OTHER POR-
TIONS. 
Appellants argue that the court must either accept or reject 
the findings of the advisory jury in their entirety; that it was 
improper for the court to "pick and choose." Respondents answer 
that it is elementary that the function of an advisory jury is 
only advisory. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 39(c) provide for an ad-
visory jury. Professor Moore has interpreted the use of an ad-
visory jury under Federal Rule 39(c), which is similar to the 
Utah Rule, as merely an aid to the judge since the judge still must 
make his own Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and must bear 
the ultimate responsibility for the judgment. See 5 Mooref s Fed-
eral Practice, §39.10(1). It was not reversible error for the 
court to be selective in its acceptance of the jury's findings. 
Furthermore, the court only rejected the answer to interro-
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gatory No. 1^ out of 16_ interrogatories submitted to the jury. 
It was obvious that the jury misunderstood the question, because 
it was negatively phrased for this was the only interrogatory 
that was answered in the appellants favor. When considered with 
the jury's other answers it is patently clear that if it had not 
been for the reverse phraseology this question too would have been 
answered in favor of the respondents* 
POINT IX 
THE ENTIRE TRANSCRIPT AMPLY SUPPORTS THE CREDIBILITY OF THE 
BAGNALLS. 
In response to appellants1 Point IX, in which appellants ar-
gue that the testimony of the Bagnalls was contradictory, respon-
dents answer that any question as to credibility of the Bagnalls 
could only be determined by an appellate court on the basis of 
the entire record. Even if there exists some minor, inconsequen-
tial contradiction in respondents1 testimony, still the overwhel-
ming bulk of the evidence clearly supports the credibility of the 
Bagnalls, 
POINT X 
RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO HAVE THE JUDGMENT AFFIRMED BASED. 
UPON THE STATUS OF THE RECORD ON APPEAL. 
The appellants chose to selectively designate only those por-
tions of the trial transcript and exhibits which were favorable 
to their position on appeal. The record of the appellants on ap-
peal covers only the following portions of the trial transcript: 
(a) Testimony of Lynn Nielson. 
(b) Rebuttal Testimony of J.R* Bagnall on the afternoon 
of April 29, 1974. 
(c) All cross and re-cross examinations of Joseph R. Bagnall Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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beginning April 24, 1974. 
(d) All testimony of Edgar R. Anderson. 
(e) Cross examination of Don V. Tibbs. 
(f) Direct testimony of Reed R. Maxfield. 
(h) Direct examination of Lester R. Romero by defendants' 
attorney, Robert L. Lord. 
(i) All cross examination of Florence Bagnall. 
(j) Direct examination of .Bruce Watkins. 
Appellants omitted the following testimony: 
(a) Direct examination of J.R. Bagnall. 
(b) Re-direct examination of J.R. Bagnall. 
(c) Direct examination of Don V. Tibbs. 
(d) Cross examination of Jackson Wanlass. 
(e) All cross examination of Reed R. Maxfield. (Note: 
Respondent called Mr. Maxfield as an adverse v/itness) . 
(f) Cross, re-direct, and re-cross of Lester R. Romero. 
(g) All direct and re-direct of Florence Bagnall. 
(h) Cross, re-direct, re-cross,, further re-direct of 
Bruce Watkins. 
(i) All testimony of Mildred S. Maxfield. 
(j) All testimony of Lavera Maxfield. 
(k) All testimony of Leland Peterson. 
(1) All testimony of John Brown. 
.(m) All testimony of Edgar Anderson. 
(n) All testimony of Lynn Nielson. 
(0) All testimony of Robert Lord. 
Appellants designated only the following exhibits: 
(1) Plaintiffs1 exhibits 3-7, 10, 11, 14-18, 27, 29-32, 3 
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36 and 40. • 
(2) Defendants1, exhibits 12-20, 22, 25, 26, 32-35, 46 and 47. 
Appellants elected to omit the following exhibits: 
(1) Plaintiffs1 exhibits 1, 2, 8, 9, 12, 13, 19-26, 28, 33, 
35, 37-39 and 41-58. 
(2) Defendants' exhibits 21, 23, 24, 27-31, 36-45, 48 and 49. 
(There were no defendants1 exhibits 1-11). 
It should be noted that plaintiffs1 exhibit 9 was a schedule 
of payments showing the delinquent amounts owed by the appellants. 
Plaintiffs' exhibit 12 was a summary of the escrow account showing 
what had been deposited by the appellants. 
Respondent refers the Court to pages 672, 676-680 of the 
record which is a record of the witnesses called and the exhibits 
introduced at trial. A cursory examination of the exhibits omitted 
by appellants, as outlined above, will show that other relevant 
exhibits were not designated by the appellants. 
Appellants' burden on appeal is to show that the findings 
and conclusions of the trial court are in error. Latimer v. 
Katz, 29 U\2d 280, 508 P.2d 542 (1973), Ewell & Son,. Inc. v. 
Salt Lake City Corporation, 27 U.2d 188, 493 P.2d 1283 (1972). 
This is true because the actions of the trial court are clothed 
with a presumption of validity, and the appellant must show such 
serious inequity as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion. 
Searle. v. Searle, 522 P.2d 697 (Utah, 1974). The appellate court 
will reverse the decision of the trial court only if the evidence 
clearly preponderates against the trial court's findings and 
judgment. Del Porto v. Nicolo, 27 U.2d 286, 495 P.2d 811 
(1972), and First Western Fidelity v. Gibbons & Reed Company, 27 
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U.2d 1, 492 P.2d 132 (1971). 
To sustain the burden of showing that the trial court's 
decision was in error, appellants are required to bring all the 
evidence relating to the issues on appeal before the court, in 
order to allow the court to determine the weight and validity of 
the evidence presented at the trial. The appellate court requires 
all of the record in order to knowingly decide the issues, This 
rule is lucidly stated in Buchanan v. Crites, 106 Utah 423, 150 
P.2d 100 (1944): 
"On appeal the appellant has the burden 
of showing wherein the trial, court erred. 
If the record is not sufficient to deter-
mine a material question because of the 
fact that the appellant has failed to bring 
enough of it before us, the doubts should 
be resolved in favor of sustaining the 
judgment." Id. at 101. 
This rule has been reaffirmed in James Manufacturing Company 
v> Wilson, 15 U.2d 210, 390 P.2d 127 (1964), a case whose facts 
are very similar to this case. In James the appellant was con-
testing the sufficiency of the evidence which supported the trial 
court's judgment. The appellant had not designated all of the 
trial record on appeal. The Utah Supreme Court ruled that: 
. . . plaintiff saw fit to include only 
a portion of the testimony in the re-
cord upon this appeal. Under the cir-
cumstances it is impossible for this court 
to properly assess the entire evidence and 
determine whether the trial court was cor-
rect in denying these motions of the plain-
tiff. It must, therefore, be presumed that 
the rulings were supported by the evidence 
produced at the trial." Id. at 129. 
See also Owyhee, Inc. v. Robbins Marco Polo, 17 U„2d 181, 
407 P.2d 565 (1965), Bennett Leasing Company v. Ellison, 15 U.2d 
72, 387 P.2d 246 (1963), Walker Bank & Trust Company v. Neilson, 
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26 U.2d 383, 490 P.2d 328 (.1971) and Watkins v. Siraonds, 14 
U.2d 406, 385 P.2d 154 (1963). 
The Supreme Court has thus repeatedly stated that failure 
to designate all of the pertinent record will result in a pre-
sumption that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support 
the verdict. 
These opinions are in line with reason and the decisions 
of courts in other jurisdictions. 
"If the evidence is not in the record, 
the presumption is that is was suffi-
cient to sustain the judgment, and that 
it supported all findings of fact and 
all facts pleaded and essential to the 
judgment. If only part of the evidence 
is in the record, the presumption is 
that the omitted evidence supports the 
judgment, and that is sufficient to 
cure any defects in the evidence brought 
up
*
ff
 4 Am. Jr. 2d, Appeal and Error, 
§526. 
The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure now require that 
the entire transcript be sent by the clerk of the court to the 
appellate court unless the parties stipulate to omit unnecessary 
evidence. F.R.A.P. 10(a). Appellants in the federal courts 
have the responsibility . . . 
". . . to insure that the record contains 
everything that is necessary for the 
determination of the issues presented by 
the appeal » . . ." 9 Moore's Federal 
Practice, 11210.03.. 
These federal courts realized long ago that the entire 
record pertaining to the issues was necessary in order to evaluate 
the claims of the appellant. To proceed otherwise would result 
in conjecture and injustice. This problem has been recognized in 
the federal courts and by the Utah Supreme Court for many years, 
and the problem has been remedied by requiring the designation of 
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all the trial record relevant to the appeal. 
Appellants in this case have omitted almost all of the 
evidence favorable to the respondent relating to the issues on 
appeal. Appellants for the most part have included only the 
direct testimony of their witnesses and the cross-examination of 
adverse witnesses. This is an obvious attempt to slant the 
weight and credibility of the evidence at trial. It is just this 
sort of abuse that the Utah Supreme Court has attempted to eliminate 
by the rulings cited above. 
This objection is particularly relevant to Point IX of 
appellants1 brief. In this point appellants allege that a 
reading of the entire transcript reveals that the plaintiffs' 
testimony is contradictory. Appellant is required to produce 
the entire transcript in order for this Court to analyze this 
claim. If this record is not included/ this Court should, 
affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
Appellants1 designated record is insufficient to allow 
this Court to knowledgeably analyze the findings and judgment 
of the trial court. Appellants have failed to meet their 
burden of,proof on appeal because the Court must presume that 
the trial court's findings and judgment were supported by the 
omitted evidence. Appellants1 failure to designate all of the 
trial record pertaining to the issues on appeal is fatal to 
their argument and the appeal should be dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondents conclude that the judgment in favor of the res-
pondents and against the appellants forfeiting the real estate 
agreement and quieting title in the respondents, except for an 
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undivided 1/2 interest in 14 0.15 acres, should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
and Respondents 
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